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Alcohol Policy and Student Welfare
J. Seth May
The University of Tennessee
Alcohol policies at dry campuses are often stringent and severe. Such policies are aimed
at enforcing the rules of the university and attempt to increase student welfare by
discouraging unsafe consumption on campus. While the goal of these policies is to
promote student welfare, the policies create powerful incentives to not seek help when
dangerous alcohol incidents arise, which can lead to a decrease in student welfare. This
study looks at the incentives to seek help when dangerous incidents arise and to exercise
care which reduces the likelihood ofsuch incidents, particularly in the context of events
hosted by a student organization or fraternity.
Introduction
Universities and colleges are often dry campuses, prohibiting all alcohol consumption on
campus premises. Presumably this is to prevent individuals below the age of twenty-one
from drinking and to promote a better academic environment for students. Another goal
that is a top priority for institutions of higher learning is keeping students safe, protecting
their life and property. These two priorities, restricting alcohol consumption and
promoting student safety, can run opposite each other. If a university's policies prohibit
all alcohol consumption it can be difficult to promote safe consumption. This would not
be a problem if students were in fact fully deterred from drinking on campus, but in
reality students will drink underage, and they will drink on campus. Given that this is the
case, a university may seek to promote consumption when it occurs. Unfortunately, the
incentives to drink safely and act responsibly may be undermined at most dry campuses
by precisely those policies that are established to deter alcohol consumption.
When students first come to college most are under the legal drinking age of
twenty-one, and presumably have limited experience with alcohol. They have received
little instruction on safe consumption, and do not know the amount of alcohol they can
safely consume. Many will also not be able to recognize when their friends have had too
much to drink. In this period of experimentation and learning students may make bad
choices, and due to the harsh punishments levied against them should they be caught
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while intoxicated, or merely with a drink in their hand, they are not encouraged to act
responsib ly.
The majority of this paper will be dedicated to modeling the decision making
process involved in determining the level of care students (or student organizations such
as fraternities) will exercise when hosting an event where alcohol is present, and finding
how to encourage student decision makers to act responsibly at such incidents,
particularly looking at how to encourage decision makers to contact proper authorities if
events escalate beyond their control.

Literature Review
While literature dealing with student leaders' decision making process is scant in
respect to alcohol policy on college campuses, other areas have principles or observations
which are helpful to the question at hand. Basic models of enforcement have insights
which are relevant; studies of zero tolerance policies also have interesting additions to the
model.
One point to take from Polinsky and Shavell's (2000) review of public
enforcement law is that, generally speaking, "accidental harms" can be deterred in the
same way as calculated harms. That is, a crime which might be committed out of
negligence can be deterred in the same fashion as one committed out of malice. This is
relevant to alcohol policies at universities because student groups hosting a party will
rarely encourage students to drink to dangerous levels in hopes that they will die of
alcohol poisoning. Because this is the case, such accidental crimes can be punished the
same as the crime of having alcohol on a dry campus, almost certainly a willful violation
of the law. Another insight of Polinsky and Shavell is that such sanctions can be levied
as act based, or harm based. An act based sanction is based on the amount of precautions
an entity took to prevent the harm from happening; a harm based sanction will be levied
by the harm done by it. If student groups are to be punished for alcohol violations, the
punishing authority (most often the university) must determine if sanctions are based on
the student group having alcohol, and therefore committing an act which makes harm
more likely, or if the sanction will scale depending on the precautions the group took,
which could make the harm more or less likely.
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Zero tolerance policies, where a minor violation of a policy receives the same
punishment as a major violation, have a bearing on the topic of alcohol policies and
student welfare as well. If a student who has had one drink will be punished the same as
a student who is found passed out in front of his dorm, the university's policies do little to
encourage more moderate, responsible behavior. While supporters claim that zero
tolerance policies are the best form of deterrence, Skiba (Skiba 2000) concludes that this
is not the case. Zero tolerance policies are not an effective form of deterrence, and can
even lead to further policy violations by students.

Methodology
In the process of developing the models for the decision making process it is
useful to develop a hypothetical situation. In this situation a freshman student has been
drinking heavily, though no one is sure how much. The student is unconscious and
barely responsive, and the decision maker (the party responsible for the student, e.g. the
president of a fraternity, the host of a party, etc) is unsure as to whether proper authorities
should be contacted to render aid to the student. The decision maker knows he cannot
accurately gauge the student's condition. Let the student's actual condition be denoted
by

CE

[0,1]. This parameter represents how severely affected the student is; if C<.5 the

student will recover without medical aid. Otherwise the student will require treatment and
will suffer serious adverse consequences (including possible death) if aid is not obtained.
The parameter c is a random variable drawn the uniform distribution on [0,1]. The
decision maker cannot ascertain the affected student's condition with perfect accuracy.
Let the decision maker's best estimate of the student's condition be denoted by c, such
that C=C+E. The parameter E captures the error in ascertaining the student's condition and
is assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution on [-.5,.5]. Given these assumptions,
C also represents the perceived probability that the student's true condition c exceeds .5,
and the student will become seriously ill or die of alcohol poisoning if aid is not obtained.
When choosing whether to seek aid the decision maker evaluates the expected
costs of the two alternatives (seek aid or not). Assume that if the decision maker contacts
authorities he will suffer penalty y; ifhe does not seek help and the student becomes
severely ill or dies he will suffer penalty x, where x>y. There is also a chance that the
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event will be detected. The probability of the event being detected is denoted by p. If the
event is detected the fraternity will suffer penalty T(k), where penalty T is a function of
the amount of care (k) put into the event. Variable k can represent prior planning to
prevent students from drinking too much alcohol, having other students or individuals
watching to make sure no one drinks too much, or any other form of care or precaution.
Depending on the university, T may be more or less responsive to k, but it is assumed to
be (weakly) decreasing in k. Note that if aid is sought or the student becomes severely ill
the event will be revealed and T(k) will be incurred.
With these variables established the student's cost ifhe seeks aid is y + T(k) and
he does not seek aid his expected cost is c(x + T(k)) + (1- c)pT(k). The critical value at or
above which aid will be sought is found at the point where the expected cost is identical
whether or not aid is sought. This is obtained by finding the value of c for which the
following expression equals zero.
(1)

c(x+ T(k»+(l-c)pT(k) -(y+ T(k»

By solving for zero, one can find the value of c, shown below.
(2)

A

c=

y+(I-p)T(k)
x+(I- p)T(k)

-'------'----=--'--~

This optimal value of c, denoted as c*, is the point at which the costs to the decision
maker are the same whether he chooses to seek medical attention for an ill student or not.
Another variable pertinent to improving student welfare is the choice of care k
which will be chosen by the decision-maker to minimize his cost of hosting an alcohol
event. In order to find the optimal value ofk a decision maker must consider the costs of
care, denoted as <I>(k); it is also assumed that the more care is shown it is less likely that a
student will become critically ill. Denote this relationship as q(k), where q'(k)<O. Given
these two new variables the decision maker can accurately assess the optimal value ofk.
The cost of the event as a function of care is shown below:
(3)

(l-c*)(y+ T(k))+C*{ C; (X+T(k»)+(l- C*)PT(k)}
2

The first term is the cost should a student be taken to the hospital multiplied by the
percent chance that this is necessary. The second term is the sum cost of not taking a
student to the hospital should the student fall ill or die (the first bracketed term) and the
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cost should this not happen, multiplied by the percent chance that a student is not taken to
the hospital, represented in this case by c* .
Given the above cost structure, the decision maker will attempt to minimize the expected
cost function with respect to his choice of k, as shown below. The expected cost
function is denoted V.
min V == ¢(k) + (l-q(k))pT(k)+
k

(4)

J
{c*
)}}
q(k1.(I-C*XY+T(k))+c*
T(x+T(k))+ (I-c *pT(k)
T

As one can see, the

above equation is the sum of all costs multiplied by the chance ofthe cost being relevant.
In the case of <l>(k) it is certain that at a given level of care one will have to pay the full

price for it, and so no mUltiplier is present. To find the optimal value ofk one must take
the derivative of the above function with respect to k and set it equal to zero. The first
order condition, rearranged in the fashion of MC(k)=MB(k) is shown below.
(5)

~'(k) = -q'(k ){z- pT(k)} - T'(k){ p(l-q(k ))+q(k){[(\-C*) + c;] +

+*- c;')}}

Equation (5) indicates the marginal benefit of care, and therefore the optimally
chosen degree of care, increases with the magnitUde of penalty,

T(k), with the

responsiveness of penalties to the care exercised, T'(k), with the probability of detection
of an event p, and with the responsiveness to care of the probability a student becomes ill,

q'(k).
Discussion

Given the above cost structures, and that universities do indeed want to raise student
welfare, there are two variables universities should attempt to change. The variable c*,
the point above which a decision maker will contact authorities or seek medical help,
should be as low as possible. Variable k, the care which a decision maker will put into an
event, should be as high as possible. By changing these variables appropriately an ill
student will receive the appropriate amount of attention, while decision makers will do
their best to prevent the problem from arising at all.
By changing several policy variables university officials can create an
environment where decision makers benefit from choosing a low c*. As shown in
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formula 2, lowering y and raising x will result in a lower c*. This means that by lowering
the penalty for carrying a dangerously intoxicated student to the hospital university
officials can encourage students to do so; conversely, by raising the penalty should a
student die from alcohol poisoning officials can do the same. By lowering T(k), the
punishment if an event involving alcohol is detected relative to the amount of care shown
at the event, decision makers will be more likely to voluntarily suffer that punishment
rather than face punishment x. Interestingly, a final way university officials can promote
a low c* is to raise the probability of detection. This could be accomplished by
encouraging more police scrutiny or more random walkthroughs of fraternity houses and
such.
As shown in formula 5 university officials can encourage a high amount of care (a
high value k) through several methods. As seen, -q(k) and term multiplied by it are both
greater than zero. This signifies that the relationship between the amount of care taken
and the likelihood that a student will succumb to alcohol poisoning can affect a higher
levelofk. By encouraging q(k) to be more responsive to k university officials can raise
the marginal benefits of care, leading decision makers to be willing to invest more of the
costs associated with care. This could be done by offering (or requiring) alcohol
education classes, classes which teach decision makers how to tell a student has drank too
much and cut them offbefore a problem arises, teaching them how to encourage safe
drinking.
A more concrete way to promote a higher amount of care is to make punishment
T(k) more responsive to k. If students receive a lesser punishment (possibly reaching
zero if enough care is shown) for taking precautions to prevent a student from drinking
too much they will be more likely to do so. If showing more care greatly decreases their
punishment it will be much more beneficial to do so than it if only marginally reduces
their punishment. For instance at a true dry campus, where any amount of alcohol or
drunkenness is found is given the same punishment, then T(k) does not depend on kat
all, and T'(k) will be zero. This would eliminate the second half of equation 5 and,

ceteris paribus, would reduce care.

Conclusion
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It has been shown that policy makers at dry campuses have several options to increase
student welfare. By changing the cost structures students face for seeking help for
dangerously intoxicated students they can make students more likely to do so; there is
also much a university can do to encourage decision makers which may be hosting an
event involving alcohol to show more care and precaution at the event. There is also
much left which can be done to improve and test the models above.
One step would be to simply test the thesis. While it would be difficult to coerce
university officials to change their policies in order to test them, an easier method of
testing may be conducting surveys. These surveys might try to divine how accurately
students can perceive an intoxicated individuals' condition, at which point a decision
maker might seek help for such an individual, and whether any of the punishments listed
above would influence their decisions.
Alternatively, scholars could survey the alcohol policies at different universities
and attempt to measure how severe various punishments were, and try to isolate changes
to one punishment to measure its affects on decision makers' choices.
Finally, the model itself could be refined. A variable that could be added is the size of
the events at which students become seriously ill. Ifthe number or condition of
dangerously intoxicated students correlates with the size of parties or gatherings it could
be that there is an "optimal party size", where the risks and costs find an acceptable
compromise with the benefits of such.
Whatever the course of future research, it is important that the academic
community take a hard and honest look at the alcohol policies of colleges and
universities. The loss of even one student's life is an unforgivable travesty if the cause is
outdated policies.
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